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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you represent a corporate debtor in a United States chapter 11 
proceeding.  A creditor files a large claim, one of the largest in the case.  The 
claim calls for payments to be made far into the future.  The court concludes 
the debtor is liable and instructs the parties to brief the appropriate measure 
of damages.  Finance 101 tells you that the quantum of damages for future 
payments will depend on the discount rate, i.e. the assumed rate of interest 
applied to discount the future payments to present value.  Indeed, bankruptcy 
courts are regularly called upon to determine discount rates for future cash 
flows.1  You advocate for a reasonable discount rate, one that accurately 
reflects market conditions and properly captures the harm claimed.  You 
might point to treasury yields or average stock market returns, but you focus 
on the actual damage suffered and how to best calculate the value of that 
damage over time.  Your adversary, however, claims the unilateral right to 
define its own discount rate, and, moreover, states flatly that this rate need 
not be supported by any evidence, is beyond debate, and cannot be 
questioned by the court.  Imagine further that your opponent proposes a 
discount rate that yields a claim that is twice, three times, or even 25 times 
the amount that would be calculated using a discount rate implied by actual 
market conditions – leading to a claim far in excess of the damage actually 
suffered by the creditor.  Finally, suspend disbelief and assume that the court 
agrees with your adversary.  Your debtor faces an outsized claim, and other 
creditors holding admitted claims – creditors whose claims have been 
determined in the traditional fashion focusing on the damage actually 
 
 1.   See generally Gregory M. Gordon et. al., Present Value Discounting of Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 33 (2008) (citing as examples, in addition to 
claims by the PBGC, claims under unexpired leases and executory contracts and for rejection 
damages or prepetition breaches, claims by employees and retirees, claims under long-term 
debt instruments and related guaranties, and mass tort claims).  
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suffered – have their recoveries substantially diluted. 
This is not a far-fetched hypothetical.  This real-life scenario regularly 
confronts debtors facing claims filed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (“PBGC”), the federal agency charged with administering the 
insurance program for U.S. private-sector, defined-benefit pension plans 
protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”).2  In the event of a termination of such a pension plan, the PBGC 
takes control of the pension plan’s assets and is responsible to make 
payments to the pensioners covered by the plan subject to a statutory cap.3  
As a result, the PBGC is empowered by statute to bring a claim against the 
sponsor of the terminated pension plan for any shortfall between the value 
of the plan assets transferred to the PBGC and the expected future benefit 
payments payable to pensioners, known as unfunded benefit liabilities 
(“UBL”) under ERISA.4  Since pension benefits are by their nature paid out 
over time and are contingent on factors such as mortality and retirement, the 
PBGC’s UBL claim must be estimated in order to be recovered, and, once 
estimated, an interest rate must be applied to those future payments to 
discount them to present value.  Unlike other creditors seeking recovery for 
future payment streams, however, the PBGC maintains that it has the right 
to set its own discount rate.  In 1975, the PBGC adopted a regulation pursuant 
to which it calculates the amount of its claims, prescribing assumptions as to 
mortality and retirement, as well as the discount rate to be applied (the 
“Valuation Regulation”).5  For over 40 years, the PBGC has used the 
Valuation Regulation to calculate claims in U.S. bankruptcies. 
The PBGC’s methodology involves a survey of insurance company 
annuity prices that the PBGC uses, in conjunction with its own assumptions 
as to mortality and retirement, to “solve” for the interest factors that it applies 
to discount future payments (for purposes of this Article, the “Annuity 
Interest Factors,” though that term is not used by the PBGC).  Annuity 
contracts are contracts between an investor and an insurance company in 
which the investor gives a lump sum to the insurance company in exchange 
for a stream of periodic payments in the future.  These are by definition low 
(near zero) risk investments, offered only by well-capitalized financial 
 
 2.   Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(1974), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 – 1461.  
 3.   The statutory limit is beyond the scope of this Article.  For simplicity, we assume 
here that the full amount of benefits is guaranteed, though this is not necessarily true in every 
situation. 
 4.   The transfer of the pension plan assets and the related commencement of payment 
by the PBGC of pension obligations may in practice post-date plan termination. 
 5.   29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-75.  The Valuation Regulation allows for the use of more than 
one discount rate depending on the time period involved, though each discount rate would be 
based on the Annuity Interest Factors described infra.  
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institutions, and typically imply a low discount rate.  In theory, the PBGC’s 
use of the Annuity Interest Factors could make sense if the PBGC purchased 
annuity contracts to lock in a low risk instrument that would fund the 
required payments over time.  If the PBGC purchased annuity contracts, 
there would be a perfect match between the damage suffered by the PBGC 
and the cost incurred by the PBGC in remedying that damage.6 
There is a hitch, however.  The PBGC does not buy annuity contracts.  
Instead, it employs a sophisticated and diversified investment strategy that 
over time has yielded average returns of about 8%,7 significantly higher than 
the returns that would be obtained through the purchase of annuities.  The 
difference between the discount rate implied by the Annuity Interest Factors 
and the actual rate of return on the PBGC’s investment portfolio means that 
by using the Valuation Regulation, the PBGC claims the right to collect more 
money than it needs to meet future pension obligations for any given 
terminated plan.  The difference can be dramatic:  In one reported case, the 
difference between the PBGC’s UBL claim based on the Valuation 
Regulation and the amount of the claim based on an assumed rate of return 
based on a diversified portfolio (at times referred to as the “prudent investor 
rate”) was over $47 million – a difference of some 95%.8  At the same time, 
the PBGC, which unlike insurance companies suffers from a significant 
deficit,9 is unable to provide the certainty of an annuity.  In other words, the 
PBGC effectively charges sponsors of terminating plans for a level of 
certainty that it cannot in fact provide to plan participants once it assumes 
 
 6.   This approach is used in the United Kingdom under the Pensions Act 1995, c. 26 § 
74 (UK), whereby upon the termination of the covered pension plan, the plan trustees will 
purchase an annuity to provide for payment of their equivalent of UBL.  Also, in the United 
Kingdom, the plan assets of unrelated terminated plans are not co-mingled in a single pool as 
is the case in the U.S.  
 7.   See Table 1 and accompanying discussion, infra. 
 8.   PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001).  The PBGC’s UBL claim based on the Valuation 
Regulation was $49,658,702.19, while the amount of the claim based on a prudent investor 
rate was $1,822,075.19.  Id. 
 9.   The PBGC’s 2016 annual report indicates a deficit of $20.6 billion for the single-
employer program and $58.8 billion for the multiemployer program.  2016 PENSION BENEFIT 
GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 10.  The Government Accountability Office has been highlighting the 
financial difficulties and chronic underfunding of the PBGC for decades, stating, for example, 
in a 1989 report that “[s]ince its inception, the program’s losses and administrative costs have 
exceeded premiums collected.”  U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-90-11, 
FEDERAL CREDIT AND INSURANCE: PROGRAMS MAY REQUIRE INCREASED FEDERAL 
ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE 32 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-90-
11 [https://perma.cc/DE38-RL3N].  After this Article was prepared, the PBGC released its 
2017 Annual Report, indicating a $10.9 billion deficit for the single-employer program and a 
$65.1 billion deficit for the multiemployer program.  2017  PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. 
ANN. REP. 10. 
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responsibility for the benefits at issue. 
Since the PBGC’s UBL claim only comes into play when a pension plan 
is terminated – and since under current law a plan sponsor can only 
voluntarily terminate an underfunded plan when it meets one of several 
statutory tests for financial distress – issues surrounding the PBGC’s 
Valuation Regulation to date have only been litigated in the bankruptcy 
courts.10  In this context, the PBGC’s unilateral selection of a discount rate 
affects not only the debtors, but other pari passu unsecured creditors as well, 
all of whom must seek recovery from the same limited pool of assets, but 
none of whom enjoy comparable license to dictate the discount rate 
applicable to future payments.11  Litigants have therefore argued – sometimes 
successfully, sometimes not – that a bankruptcy court should disregard the 
Valuation Regulation when it leads to an overstatement of the PBGC’s UBL 
claim (i.e., when it overstates the amount by which the plan is actually 
underfunded), and instead make its own estimation of the amount the PBGC 
will likely need to satisfy future pension obligations, just as a bankruptcy 
court would estimate similar claims for future cash flows when brought by 
non-PBGC creditors.  To do otherwise, the argument goes, would provide 
the PBGC with an unearned “windfall” in excess of the amount it likely 
needs to meet the terminated plan’s future pension obligations.  Indeed, the 
significant – sometimes massive – disparity between the size of the PBGC’s 
UBL claim under the Valuation Regulation and the prudent investor rate is 
so substantial that it has an in terrorem effect on settlement dynamics, not 
unlike the pressure put on criminal defendants under the Federal Sentencing 
 
 10.   ERISA provides two ways for a plan sponsor to voluntarily terminate a pension plan: 
standard and distress.  First, in a “standard” termination, the plan contains sufficient assets to 
meet the benefits owed or promised to participants, and so the employer distributes the assets 
to the participants through the purchase of annuities from private insurance companies or 
through payment of an upfront lump sum to participants.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(b).  In this 
situation, the PBGC has no liability to pay and does not pay benefits to participants in the 
terminated plan.  Second, in a “distress” termination, the plan is underfunded and the 
employer may only terminate if it satisfies one of four statutory distress tests.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(c).  In a distress termination, the PBGC takes over the plan and assumes both the assets 
and the responsibility for paying benefits.  ERISA also provides a means for involuntary 
termination instituted by the PBGC.  29 U.S.C. § 1342.  In an involuntary termination, the 
PBGC also takes over the plan and assumes both the assets and the responsibility for paying 
benefits. 
 11.   While this Article looks at the harm to pari passu creditors arising from the PBGC’s 
policy, there are likely harms to plan participants as well, since the PBGC uses the same 
Valuation Regulation to determine the allocation of plan benefits upon termination.  See 
AMERICAN RETIREES EDUC. FOUND., PENSION GUARANTEES THAT WORK FOR RETIREES: A 
PROPOSAL FOR COMMONSENSE PBGC REFORMS 13-20 (February 1, 2017), available at 
http://www.nrln.org/flyin%20whtpprs/WP.%20PBGC%20Rules%20Reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8NF-UGBK] (discussing the consequences of PBGC’s interest rate 
assumptions for American retirees). 
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Guidelines. 
The “windfall” argument against the Valuation Regulation has had 
mixed results.  Both the Tenth and Sixth Circuits have held that the Valuation 
Regulation does not control in bankruptcy when it comes into conflict with 
the central bankruptcy principle that all similarly situated creditors be treated 
alike, and have instead applied a prudent investor rate.12  In 2003, however, 
the bankruptcy court overseeing the U.S. Airways chapter 11 proceedings 
broke with these precedents and held that it was bound by the Valuation 
Regulation, explicitly disagreeing with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.13  
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Raleigh v. Illinois Department 
of Revenue,14 the U.S. Airways court held that the substantive non-
bankruptcy law that gave rise to the PBGC’s UBL claim – ERISA and the 
PBGC’s implementing regulations – applied in bankruptcy, regardless of the 
effect on other creditors.15  Since then, no circuit court has addressed the 
issue, but every bankruptcy court to do so has followed U.S. Airways, albeit 
with little or no independent analysis.16  The PBGC has made no secret of 
the importance of these decisions to its strategy in pursuing outsized 
bankruptcy claims and how that strategy aids the agency in its efforts to 
climb out of its multi-billion dollar deficit.  As it stated in 2013, “[t]hese 
decisions have given PBGC significant leverage in enforcing its 
underfunding claims at a time when the agency faces a $23 billion deficit,” 
and “[i]ndeed, PBGC has not had a claims objection litigated to decision 
since the above cases were decided.”17 
Whether bankruptcy courts are in fact bound to apply the Valuation 
Regulation is a question that implicates thorny and conflicting issues of 
bankruptcy, ERISA, and administrative law.  For one thing, the holding in 
Raleigh arguably should not apply to this fact pattern, as the prudent investor 
issue is, in practice, primarily litigated in bankruptcy.  Moreover, application 
of the Valuation Regulation, which increases the PBGC’s UBL claim beyond 
any reasonable estimate of the PBGC’s own costs of providing the pension 
benefits, clashes directly with the fundamental principle of bankruptcy law 
that similarly situated creditors be treated alike, with none being entitled to 
 
 12.   PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators 
of Utah, Inc.), 150 F. 3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999). 
 13.   In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 14.   530 U.S. 15 (2000). 
 15.   U.S. Airways, 303 B.R. at 793.  
 16.   See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.  
 17.   U.S. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., DERIVATION OF INTEREST FACTORS IN PBGC’S 
LIABILITY VALUATION METHODOLOGY 12 (Sept. 6, 2013), available at https://www.pbgc.gov
/documents/LiabilityValuation-20130906.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2FMY-JSUG] [hereinafter 
the “WHITE PAPER”]. 
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a claim in an amount greater than what it is owed.  At the same time, 
however, any challenge to the validity of the Valuation Regulation must 
confront principles of administrative law, including deference to reasonable 
agency interpretations of the statutes they administer under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)18 and the Chevron19 doctrine, which 
provides that broad, but not unlimited, deference be given to federal agency 
determinations. 
This Article proposes a different path through this legal thicket.20  
Sidestepping the Raleigh question, this Article argues that the PBGC’s 
current Valuation Regulation is invalid – both in bankruptcy and outside 
bankruptcy – because it leads to an overstatement of the PBGC’s claim that 
is directly contradictory to the PBGC’s own rationale for the Valuation 
Regulation put forward in the Federal Register during the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.  As stated by the PBGC as early as 1975 and 
as recently as 1993, the rationale for the Valuation Regulation is that the 
amount of the PBGC’s claim should be based on the PBGC’s own costs in 
providing the pension benefits.  This traditional definition of a damages 
claim makes sense, as the only purpose of the PBGC’s right to collect a UBL 
claim is to allow it to pay out future pension benefits.  The problem, however, 
is that the Annuity Interest Factors currently used in the Valuation 
Regulation significantly overstate the cost to the PBGC of providing the 
pension benefits, thus resulting in an artificially low discount rate, which in 
turn results in an artificially high UBL claim. 
Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard requires that an agency examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”21  Even if the 
 
 18.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2011).  
 19.   See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(discussing deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they 
administer).  
 20.   While a few articles discuss the PBGC’s Valuation Regulation and the conflict that 
arises when that regulation is applied in bankruptcy, none has conducted the analysis 
presented here.  See, e.g., Gregory M. Gordon et. al., Present Value Discounting of Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 33 (2008) (discussing the differences between 
the prudent investor rate and the PBGC’s regulatory discount rate); John H. Rains IV, Note, 
Searching for Fairness in All the Wrong Places: Valuing the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation’s Unsecured Claim in Bankruptcy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1107 (2006) (arguing that 
Congress should adopt the valuation method promulgated by the PBGC in order to increase 
the PBGC’s recovery in bankruptcy); Debra A. Riley, The Questionable Future of the 
Prudent-Investor Rate: Will ERISA Claims Dilute-Further-the Dividends for Trade 
Creditors?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. (July/Aug. 2004) (discussing potential impact of U.S. 
Airways decision). 
 21.   Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Motor 
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agency can articulate a legitimate reason for a given policy choice, its 
method of effectuating this policy choice must be rational – if there is no 
relationship between an agency’s policy objective and its approach, then the 
approach must be struck down as arbitrary and capricious.22  Despite paying 
lip service to Chevron and the APA in passing,23 litigants to date have not 
truly pursued this issue, and the courts have never squarely addressed it.  This 
Article proposes that courts should engage in the careful analysis required 
by the Supreme Court’s instruction to assess whether an agency rule is 
consistent with the facts before the agency and the agency’s stated rationale 
in adopting the regulation in light of those facts. 
This Article is divided into four Parts.  Part I provides a brief overview 
of the role of the PBGC and UBL claims in the context of the private-sector, 
defined-benefit insurance program established under ERISA.  Part II 
examines the split of authority between courts that have enforced the 
Valuation Regulation in bankruptcy and those that have concluded that it is 
not binding when it overstates the PBGC’s UBL claims.  Part III argues that 
the Valuation Regulation’s use of Annuity Interest Factors is arbitrary and 
capricious because it fails to reflect the PBGC’s actual cost of providing the 
pension benefits, and is therefore inconsistent with the PBGC’s own stated 
rationale for the regulation, if not the statute itself.  Part IV demonstrates that 
the PBGC’s attempts at post hoc rationalizations for the Annuity Interest 
Factors – including the PBGC’s arguments that the Valuation Regulation 
reflects a “market price” for the insurance it offers to plan participants and 
avoids a purported “moral hazard” that would otherwise exist – do not justify 
their use.  The Conclusion offers suggestions for reform. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF THE VALUATION REGULATION 
UNDER ERISA 
A. ERISA’s Insurance Program 
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA, a federal statute designed to protect 
certain private sector workers’ pension benefits.24  The legislation 
 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 22.   See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55-64 (2011) (holding that courts must reject 
an agency rule “unmoored from the purposes and concerns” of the relevant statute and that an 
agency must effectuate its policy choice in “some rational way” and “based on non-arbitrary, 
relevant factors” (internal citations omitted)).  
 23.   See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
 24.   At the time of its enactment, the defined benefit pension plan was the typical pension 
plan for American workers with pension benefits.  PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, 
ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 3.03 (4th ed. 2016 Supp.).  Defined contribution pension 
plans, typified by plans qualifying under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. 
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established minimum standards for participation, vesting, and funding, 
requirements for reporting and disclosure, and obligations for fiduciaries, all 
aimed at safeguarding the integrity of private pension plans and ensuring that 
plans would have sufficient assets to pay benefits when due.25 
A key component of the comprehensive reform Congress undertook 
with ERISA was the establishment of an insurance program, administered 
by the PBGC, “to protect employees against the loss of vested benefits in the 
event of plan termination.”26  The PBGC is “a wholly owned, self-financing 
government corporation,” within the Department of Labor, “charged with 
guaranteeing the payment of certain benefits in terminated” defined-benefit 
plans up to certain legal limits.27  The PBGC insures private, defined-benefit 
pension plans under two separate programs, a single-employer program and 
a multiemployer program,28 which are operated and financed separately.29  
The single-employer program insures approximately 30 million participants 
in more than 22,000 pension plans,30 while the multiemployer program 
covers over 10 million participants in approximately 1,400 pension plans.31  
According to the PBGC, since its creation in 1974, it has “become 
responsible for more than 1.5 million people in over 4,800 failed single-
employer and multiemployer plans.”32  This Article focuses on the single-
employer program, as this is the context in which the discount rate question 
has been litigated. 
The PBGC funds its insurance programs through four sources.  First, 
the PBGC collects premiums paid by plan sponsors covered under the 
program.33  Second, when the PBGC becomes the trustee for a terminated 
 
§ 401(k), were not introduced until 1978 by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 
§ 135, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785 (1978).  ERISA does not purport to cover defined benefit pension 
plans offered to public employees.  Those employees relied, and continue to rely, on the taxing 
power of the public-sector sponsor, a structure which sets the stage for its own looming crisis.   
 25.   PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE §§ 
1.01, 1.02, 1.04.  The stated purposes of ERISA included encouraging participation in 
retirement plans and addressing concerns over perceived abuses in the private pension system.  
H.R. REP. No. 93-807 (1974), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4671, 4676-81.   
 26.   H.R. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 
5184. 
 27.   H.R. REP. No. 99-300, at 278 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 756, 929; 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-271, REP. TO CONG. REQUESTERS, PENSION 
BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.: ASSET MANAGEMENT NEEDS BETTER STEWARDSHIP 3 (June 2011), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320643.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7V2-9SFP] 
[hereinafter “GAO-11-271 REPORT”]. 
 28.   29 U.S.C. §§ 1301 – 1311. 
 29.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 1. 
 30.   Id. at 3. 
 31.   Id. 
 32.   Id. at 2. 
 33.   GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.  In the 2010 fiscal year, for example, the 
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pension plan, it takes possession of the assets of the terminated plan.34  Third, 
after the termination of a plan and the assumption of that plan’s assets, the 
PBGC may assert a claim (typically in bankruptcy) against each plan sponsor 
(or any member of its “controlled group”) for the amount of unfunded benefit 
liabilities.35  Finally, the PBGC engages professional asset management 
firms to invest its assets and earns investment income from the returns on 
total assets held.36  The PBGC receives no federal taxpayer funding and the 
federal government is not required to financially assist the PBGC in meeting 
its obligations.37 
The PBGC holds its investment assets in two funds:  the revolving fund 
and the trust fund.38  The revolving fund contains the PBGC’s premium 
revenues and is invested in Treasury securities.39  Revolving fund 
investments totaled approximately $26 billion as of September 30, 2016.40  
The trust fund contains the assets recovered from trusteed plans and their 
sponsors and related investment income.41  Total trust fund investments 
amounted to approximately $65.6 billion, as of September 30, 2016.42 
The PBGC uses private investment management firms to administer its 
investment assets, in accordance with an investment policy statement.43  
Under the investment policy, the PBGC’s goal has long been to “prudently 
maximize investment returns”44 through investments mainly in equities and 
fixed-income securities; it does not buy annuities.45  According to its 2016 
Annual Report, the PBGC manages approximately $100 billion in total 
 
PBGC collected approximately $2.3 billion in premiums.   
 34.   GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.  In the 2010 fiscal year, the PBGC 
assumed approximately $1.8 billion in assets from 147 terminated defined-benefit plans.   
 35.   GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.  29 U.S.C. § 1362(b). 
 36.   GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.  For example, in the fiscal year 2010, the 
PBGC earned $7.8 billion from its investment portfolio.  Id.  
 37.   PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 1, Sep. 2016. 
 38.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 41.  
 39.   The PBGC is required by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(3), to invest a portion of the 
revolving fund assets in government debt securities.  While it has discretion to invest a portion 
of this fund in other non-governmental debt products, the PBGC’s current policy is to only 
invest in Treasury securities.  2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 41. 
 40.   Id.  
 41.   Id. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. at 11.  
 44.   2008 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 18; see 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. 
CORP. ANN. REP. 42 (stating that “[t]he objective of PBGC’s investment policy is to maximize 
funded status within a prudent risk framework that is informed by PBGC’s fixed obligations 
and asset composition of potential trusteed plans,” and noting that “[t]he investment policy 
establishes a 30 percent target asset allocation for equities and other non-fixed income assets, 
and a 70 percent asset allocation for fixed income”).   
 45.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 68. 
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assets.46  Through this strategy, the PBGC achieves average returns on its 
total assets in the range of 8 to 9 percent.47 
B. UBL Claims under ERISA 
As referenced above, one source of the PBGC’s funding is its recovery 
on claims in respect of a terminated plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities.  
Specifically, ERISA provides that the PBGC is entitled to recover “the total 
amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities (as of the termination date) [owed] 
to all participants and beneficiaries under the plan, together with interest (at 
a reasonable rate) calculated from the termination date in accordance with 
regulations prescribed by the corporation [i.e., the PBGC].”48  As amended, 
ERISA defines the “amount of unfunded benefit liabilities” to mean, “as of 
any date, the excess (if any) of – (A) the value of the benefit liabilities under 
the plan (determined as of such date on the basis of assumptions prescribed 
by the corporation for purposes of section 1344 of this title), over (B) the 
current value (as of such date) of the assets of the plan.).”49 
Congress also granted the PBGC a unique collection advantage over 
other creditors – an advantage particularly valuable in the context of a 
bankruptcy filing.  ERISA effectively pierces the corporate veil of each 
member of a corporate group, making all members jointly and severally 
liable to the PBGC for the UBL claim (as well as certain other claims the 
PBGC may be able to assert), regardless of whether any particular member 
was the plan sponsor or benefited in any way from the work performed by 
the pension plan participants.  Specifically, the statute provides that the 
PBGC is permitted to recover from any member of the plan sponsor’s 
“controlled group” – defined to mean, “in connection with any person, a 
 
 46.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 11.   
 47.   See Table 1 and accompanying discussion, infra (listing the annual and average five-
year returns reported by the PBGC). 
 48.   29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1)(A).   
 49.   29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18).  For simplicity, this Article uses the term “unfunded benefit 
liability” to refer to the PBGC’s claim regardless of time period, even though that term was 
first defined by Congress in 1987.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA), 
Pub. L. No. 100–203, § 9313, 101 Stat 1330 (1987).  In the House Report on the amendment, 
the Committee on Education and Labor “recognize[d] that valuing benefit liabilities for 
purposes of determining an employer’s liability to participants and beneficiaries may be 
difficult,” and that “in a distress or involuntary termination, such valuation results in inherent 
tension between the PBGC and the persons responsible for asserting and collecting the claims 
for unfunded benefit liabilities and for paying such liability to plan participants, because the 
PBGC and those persons are competing for the same employer dollars.”  H.R. REP. No. 100-
391, at 124 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313–99.  The Committee 
therefore explained that it “expect[ed] that the PBGC will develop standards for valuing 
benefit liabilities that are as objective as possible.”  Id.   
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group consisting of such person and all other persons under common control 
with such person” – each of which is jointly and severally liable for the UBL 
claim.50 
C. The Valuation Regulation 
The PBGC first promulgated the Valuation Regulation in a rule 
proposed in 1975, adopted on an interim basis in 1976 and finalized in 1981 
following a notice-and-comment procedure.51  The PBGC has used this 
Valuation Regulation ever since as its framework for calculating the present 
value of its bankruptcy claim, with periodic adjustments to the underlying 
assumptions used in the calculus.52 
As is relevant here, the current Valuation Regulation states as follows: 
The plan administrator shall value all benefits as of the valuation 
date by – (a) Using the mortality assumptions prescribed by 
§4044.53 and the interest assumptions prescribed in appendix B to 
this part; (b) Using interpolation methods, where necessary, at 
least as accurate as linear interpolation; (c) Using valuation 
formulas that accord with generally accepted actuarial principles 
and practices; and (d) Adjusting the values to reflect loading 
expenses in accordance with appendix C to this part.53 
The “interest assumptions prescribed in appendix B” provide the 
discount rates used to generate the PBGC’s UBL claims asserted in any 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Tellingly, the Valuation Regulation itself omits any 
explanation of how the PBGC derived the interest rates contained in 
appendix B.  Rather, appendix B simply consists of a table titled “Interest 
Rates Used To Value Benefits,” which lists only the applicable interest rate 
for a given period, nothing more.54 Thus, while a general description of the 
 
 50.   29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(14) (defining “controlled group”); 29 U.S.C. § 1362(a) (“In any 
case in which a single-employer plan is terminated in a distress termination under section 
1341(c) of this title or a termination otherwise instituted by the corporation under section 
1342 of this title, any person who is, on the termination date, a contributing sponsor of the 
plan or a member of such a contributing sponsor’s controlled group shall incur liability under 
this section.  The liability under this section of all such persons shall be joint and several.”).  
The ability of the PBGC to assert claims against all members of a corporate group, including, 
arguably, members located outside of the United States, means that the PBGC cannot suffer 
from structural subordination.  No other pre-filing unsecured creditor is granted this sort of 
priority treatment.  11 U.S.C. § 507.  Only post-filing lenders providing debtor-in-possession 
financing may be granted superior treatment by the bankruptcy court, but such treatment is 
limited expressly by the amount of the financing provided.  11 U.S.C. § 364(c), (d). 
 51.   See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text. 
 52.   See 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-75 (setting out the current Valuation Regulation). 
 53.   29 C.F.R. § 4044.52. 
 54.   29 C.F.R. Part 4044, Appendix B.   
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survey-based methodology for determining the Annuity Interest Factors has 
been included in various Federal Register publications,55 the actual codified 
regulation contains only the numbers to be used as interest factors, without 
further explanation. 
Elsewhere, however, the PBGC has explained its methodology for 
deriving the Annuity Interest Factors in greater detail.  According to the 
explanation published by the PBGC on its website, the Annuity Interest 
Factors are derived from a survey (the “Survey”) performed by the American 
Council of Life Insurers (the “ACLI”), which inquires of private insurance 
companies the price that they would charge for group annuities contracts as 
of the termination date.56  According to the PBGC, the Annuity Interest 
Factors are meant to estimate “the approximate cost of purchasing equivalent 
annuities from an insurance company in the private sector.”57  The 
participants in each Survey consist of a group of life insurers, but are 
otherwise anonymous to the PBGC.  The ACLI asks for the annuity prices 
the insurers would charge on hypothetical pension streams paying $10 a 
month to individuals starting at a given age, over various age profiles.  The 
PBGC then uses these prices to infer a new annuity pricing schedule based 
on PBGC mortality tables.  The resulting interest factors are the rates that 
best set the PBGC assumed pension payments equal to their inferred prices.58 
II. TWO CONFLICTING LINES OF CASES 
Whether the Valuation Regulation is controlling in bankruptcy remains 
unsettled.  The only two Courts of Appeals to address the issue, the Sixth 
and the Tenth Circuits, have concluded that the Valuation Regulation leads 
to an overstatement of the PBGC’s claim that is inconsistent with bankruptcy 
law and have therefore held that, at least in bankruptcy, the Valuation 
 
 55.   41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976) (“The initial interest rates used are derived 
from annuity price data obtained by PBGC from the private insurance industry.  The PBGC’s 
interest assumptions have been designed so that, when coupled with the mortality assumptions 
found in the regulation, the benefit values obtained for immediate and deferred annuities are 
in line with industry annuity prices.”); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980); 58 
Fed. Reg. 50812 (Sept. 28, 1993); 70 Fed. Reg. 12429, 12430 (Mar. 14, 2005) (providing 
general descriptions of the methodology for determining Annuity Interest Factors). 
 56.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 1. 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   This Article does not address the problems with the PBGC’s Survey-based 
methodology for determining the Annuity Interest Factors used in the Valuation Regulation.  
Rather, without endorsing the PBGC’s methodology, the Article assumes that the Annuity 
Interest Factors accurately reflect the prices that private life insurance companies would 
charge to offer group annuities of the sort as to which pricing is sought by the PBGC.  Others 
have noted, however, that the Survey methodology appears to be far from perfect.  See infra 
note 98.  
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Regulation is not controlling and that a prudent investor rate should be 
applied to calculate the PBGC’s UBL claims.59  Since In re U.S. Airways 
Grp., Inc.60 in 2003, however, every bankruptcy court to address the issue 
has held that it was bound by the Valuation Regulation.  None of these 
bankruptcy decisions has been appealed to a Court of Appeals, and as such, 
to date, no Court of Appeals has adopted the view put forward in U.S. 
Airways, and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue.61 
A. The Tenth and Sixth Circuits Have Concluded That the Prudent 
Investor Rate Applies in Bankruptcy 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue first in 1998, in PBGC v. CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.).62  As 
framed by the court in that case, “[t]he major controversy between the parties 
[was] whether the ERISA provisions carry over into bankruptcy or whether 
PBGC comes to Chapter 11 like any other unsecured creditor.”63  The PBGC, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded, “is not entitled to special rights in bankruptcy 
and its ERISA powers and rights do not give it priority over the other 
unsecured creditors of CF&I’s estate.”64 
The Tenth Circuit began by observing that “[i]nasmuch as those 
liabilities [i.e., the PBGC’s UBL claims] are for beneficiaries’ payments that 
extend into the future, the amount of the liability must be reduced to present 
value so the debt can be dealt with under the reorganization plan.”65  Indeed, 
 
 59.   PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators 
of Utah, Inc.), 150 F. 3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999). 
 60.   303 B.R. 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 61.   The lack of appeals is consistent with the deal-centric philosophy that characterizes 
most large chapter 11 proceedings.  Very often, a resolution with the PBGC is a condition for 
a company to emerge from chapter 11, as was the case with U.S. Airways, thus creating a 
situation where parties may choose to litigate the PBGC claim issue before the bankruptcy 
court on a timeline that is roughly coincident with the timeline for plan confirmation, but are 
highly incentivized to avoid lengthy appeals.  Although certain claims issues can be reserved 
for final determination post-confirmation, in most large chapter 11 cases, the size of the 
PBGC’s claims prevents post-confirmation resolution.  The fact that the PBGC’s claims are, 
by virtue of their joint-and-several nature, filed against all debtors in a multi-debtor setting 
(where the PBGC’s claims can often represent all or nearly all of the claims against certain 
debtors) nearly always requires resolution of the PBGC’s claims prior to, and thus as a 
condition to, confirmation.  
 62.   150 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1145 (1999). 
 63.   Id. at 1295. 
 64.   Id. at 1295.  The decision in CF&I also addressed questions concerning the tax and 
priority treatment of the PBGC’s claims, which are beyond the scope of this Article and 
therefore not addressed here. 
 65.   Id. at 1300. 
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the parties in CF&I agreed that 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), which provides that the 
court “shall determine the amount” of claims “as of the date of the filing of 
the petition,” mandated that the PBGC’s claim be discounted to present 
value, disagreeing only on the methodology for doing so.66  As the court 
noted, “[t]he dispute is significant because the proffered methods produce 
marked differences of $222,866,000 if PBGC’s approach is utilized or 
$124,441,000 if CF&I prevails.”67  In other words, the PBGC claimed an 
entitlement to nearly twice the sum calculated by CF&I based on the 
different assumptions in discounting. 
In holding that a prudent investor rate applied in bankruptcy, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the PBGC’s argument that the Valuation Regulation was 
controlling under Chevron, concluding that “[a]lthough valid in other 
contexts, we do not believe these principles are applicable here” for two 
reasons.68  First, the Tenth Circuit noted that ERISA’s definition of 
“unfunded benefit liabilities” in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18) is expressly limited 
to defining that term “for purposes of this title [ERISA]” and therefore, in 
the court’s view, “cannot extend to bankruptcy.”69  Second, the court held 
that the ERISA definition of unfunded benefit liabilities “conflicts with 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,” and that the Bankruptcy Code 
“controlled.”70  Citing bankruptcy’s “cardinal rule that all claims within the 
same class must be treated alike” under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4), the court 
held that “[t]hat principle would be violated here if PBGC’s interpretation of 
§ 1301(a)(18) were adopted because PBGC’s discount rate would apply only 
to it and not any other general unsecured creditor.”71  Congress, the court 
concluded, had made clear under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) that “when ERISA 
conflicts with another provision of federal law, ERISA must be 
subordinated.”72  In short, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[n]othing in the 
ERISA sections relied upon by PBGC implies a carry-over into the realm of 
bankruptcy to allow PBGC to set its own valuation methodology.”73 
Two years later, in PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.),74 the 
Sixth Circuit was confronted with the same issue.  The PBGC had argued 
below that the value of its UBL claim was $49,658,702.19, based on an 
investment return rate premised on the Valuation Regulation of “6.4% for 
 
 66.   Id. 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Id. at 1301. 
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   Id. 
 72.   Id.  
 73.   Id.  
 74.   232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 819 (2001). 
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the first 20 years and 5.75% thereafter.”75  After the bankruptcy court held 
that the Valuation Regulation assumptions used in determining that amount 
would give the PBGC an unearned “windfall,” and ruled that a prudent 
investor rate should apply, the parties stipulated that “a ‘prudent investor’ 
rate would be a 10% return,” which resulted in a claim of $1,822,075.19 – 
less than five percent of the amount generated by the Valuation Regulation.76 
While not adopting all aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis,77 the 
Sixth Circuit largely agreed with its conclusion, holding that “the bankruptcy 
court’s authority under 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) and 1123(a)(4) to determine the 
amount of claims in bankruptcy proceedings and treat creditors in the same 
class equally gives it the authority to value unfunded benefit liabilities claims 
using a ‘prudent investor rate.’”78 
The Sixth Circuit also considered, but rejected, the argument that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue,79 
which had come down after the Tenth Circuit decided CF&I, mandated a 
different outcome.  In Raleigh, the Supreme Court held that “bankruptcy 
does not alter the burden imposed by the substantive law” otherwise 
governing a state-law tax claim, reaffirming the general principles that “the 
validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law,” and 
that while “Congress of course may do what it likes with entitlements in 
bankruptcy,” courts will only presume Congress did so when it makes a clear 
indication.80  In its analysis, the Supreme Court had distinguished the burden 
of proof, which it considered a question of the claim’s “validity” – and 
therefore governed by non-bankruptcy law – from questions of claim 
“allowance,” which are governed by bankruptcy law.81  In the Sixth Circuit’s 
view, under Raleigh, “[w]hile the validity of a claim might be a matter for 
nonbankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to 
determine the allowability and amount of the claim.”82  The applicable 
discount rate, the Sixth Circuit concluded, was not a question of validity and 
therefore fell within the bankruptcy court’s purview. 
 
 75.   Id. at 507-08. 
 76.   Id. at 508. 
 77.   In particular, the CSC Indus. court stated:  “We are not entirely persuaded that the 
district and CF&I courts were correct in concluding that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d), which provides 
that ‘[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law of the United States,’ requires that the ERISA provision, 29 
U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18), be subordinated to the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 1144(d), on its face, 
applies only to subchapter I of ERISA, whereas the definition of unfunded benefit liabilities, 
section 1301(a)(18), is found in subchapter III of ERISA.”  Id. at 509.  
 78.   Id.  
 79.   530 U.S. 15 (2000). 
 80.   Id. at 17, 21, 25. 
 81.   Id. at 22-24. 
 82.   CSC Indus., 232 F.3d at 509. 
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, like the Tenth Circuit, that “[t]he 
PBGC’s authority to promulgate regulations governing the valuation of 
unfunded benefit liabilities does not extend so far as to subordinate the 
authority of the bankruptcy courts to value claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings,” and “the PBGC should be treated like any other unsecured 
creditor in the bankruptcy reorganization; therefore, the use of the ‘prudent 
investor rate’ to value the PBGC’s claim was appropriate.”83 
B. Following U.S. Airways, Bankruptcy Courts Have Concluded That 
the Valuation Regulation Controls in Bankruptcy 
Three years after the CSC Indus. decision, the bankruptcy court 
overseeing the U.S. Airways bankruptcy84 broke with the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits.  There, the PBGC asserted a UBL claim of approximately $2.219 
billion,85 based on “a discount rate of 5.1% for the first 20 years and 5.25% 
thereafter.”86  U.S. Airways objected to the PBGC’s UBL claim.  Using a 
discount rate of 8%, as well as more up to date mortality figures and different 
retirement assumptions, U.S. Airways calculated a UBL amount of only 
$894 million – roughly one third the size of the UBL claim determined under 
the Valuation Regulation.87 
The U.S. Airways court “respectfully disagree[d]” with the Sixth and 
Tenth Circuits, concluding that under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Raleigh, it was bound to apply the Valuation Regulation.88  Even while 
recognizing that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, empowered under 
the Bankruptcy Code in certain circumstances to alter legal rights as they 
exist outside of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court rejected any distinction 
between the “validity” and the “amount” of the claim under Raleigh, 
concluding that both were governed by non-bankruptcy law.89 
 
 83.   Id. at 509.  Prior to the CF&I and CSC Indus. decisions, the Bankruptcy Court in the 
Southern District of New York had held that the PBGC is not entitled to deference because it 
has no inherent expertise in determining the present value of projected future payments.  LTV 
Corp. v. PBGC (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 115 B.R. 760, 773 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d 
130 B.R. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, withdrawn, 17 E.B.C. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  
Although this decision was ultimately withdrawn by consent order after the parties settled, 
courts have continued to cite it as persuasive authority.  See, e.g., In re Loewen Grp. Int’l Inc., 
B.R. 427, 435 (Bankr. D. De. 2002).   
 84.   The U.S. Airways bankruptcy took place in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Virginia, which is located in the Fourth Circuit. 
 85.   303 B.R. at 787. 
 86.   Id. 
 87.   Id. at 788. 
 88.   Id. at 792.   
 89.   Id. at 793.  Interestingly, the bankruptcy court opined that “if the PBGC held merely 
a common-law indemnity claim for future benefits owed to the pilots, there can be little doubt 
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Despite concluding that the Valuation Regulation was controlling under 
Raleigh, the court went on to consider whether that regulation materially 
overstated the PBGC’s UBL claim.  In doing so, the court acknowledged that 
the PBGC invests its trust fund assets “in a mixture of equities and bonds 
similar to those of most pension plans” and as a result “has done pretty well 
over the long haul,” such that “returns on the PBGC’s trust fund assets over 
the 18-year period from 1985 through 2002 are approximately 10% on an 
annual basis.”90  Nevertheless, the court reasoned that “[t]he real issue is one 
of risk.”91  It concluded that since “no one can predict with certainty what 
returns the stock market will produce over the next 50 years,” and “[g]iven 
the strong societal interest in protecting pension benefits, a risk-free or nearly 
risk-free rate to value the pension liability is more appropriate than a rate 
based on optimistic projections (even if those projections are widely-shared 
by fund managers) as to the stock market’s future long-term performance.”92  
Thus, it said, “the court is unable to conclude that use of a ‘prudent investor’ 
rate is necessary to avoid overstating the actual loss resulting from the 
distress termination.”93 
Although the record does not indicate that any party made detailed 
arguments concerning the Valuation Regulation’s validity under the APA or 
Chevron,94 the bankruptcy court referenced both in concluding that the 
 
that this court would have full authority to determine an appropriate discount rate as well as 
related assumptions as to mortality and expected retirement age,” and that, “[i]n this 
connection, 8% would hardly be an unreasonable choice for a discount rate.”  Id.  It concluded, 
however, that “the court is not simply valuing a contingent future loss,” but “[r]ather, 
Congress, by statute, has expressly given the PBGC a present right to recover an amount 
determined in accordance with the valuation regulation.”  Id.  
 90.   Id. at 795. 
 91.   Id.  
 92.   Id. at 796. 
 93.   Id.  The U.S. Airways court apparently discounted the concern of a “windfall” to the 
PBGC, stating that such “‘windfall’ rhetoric must be taken with a large grain of salt” because, 
in that case, “claims are being paid with stock having an estimated value equal to less than 
two cents for each dollar in allowed claims, [such that] full allowance of the PBGC’s claim 
could never result in the PBGC receiving more than the amount of its actual loss.”  Id. at 791 
n.6.  This analysis overlooks, however, that regardless of whether claims were being paid in 
stock, worth pennies on the dollar, or in 100 cent dollars, in both cases the PBGC receives 
more than its fair share of the pool of assets if it is given an oversized claim.  Where recoveries 
are such that creditors do not receive payment in full, other creditors suffer from the PBGC’s 
outsized claim.  Where recoveries to creditors are sufficient to pay all similarly situated 
creditors in full, given the absolute priority rule embodied in Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, junior or subordinated creditors, or even preferred or common equity, 
suffer from the PBGC’s outsized claims.  There is no harmless error if the PBGC’s outsized 
claims are permitted.   
 94.   Indeed, in attempting to avoid discovery in the U.S. Airways dispute, the PBGC made 
a point of the fact that “[n]owhere in their objection to the PBGC Proof of Claim do the 
Reorganized Debtors purport to challenge the Valuation Regulation under the Administrative 
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regulation was valid.  Citing the Chevron doctrine, the court concluded that 
“considerable deference must be given to the PBGC, as the agency 
responsible for carrying out a legislatively-delegated function, for 
determining how best to implement the statutory mandate.”95  Similarly, as 
to the APA, the court concluded that “[g]iven the presumption of validity 
that must be accorded the PBGC regulation, the debtor has simply not 
presented sufficient evidence for the court to find that the survey is an 
irrational or arbitrary means for the PBGC to measure the close-out liability 
of a terminated pension plan.”96 
Critically, as to both conclusions, the U.S. Airways court assumed that 
the use of annuity pricing was relevant to the claims calculation:  “The stated 
goal of the regulation is to determine a value for the unfunded benefit 
liabilities that approximates the cost of purchasing an annuity contract from 
a commercial insurer that would pay the same benefits.”97  Though candidly 
acknowledging that the ACLI “survey has serious limitations,”98 the court 
 
Procedure[] Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, (the ‘APA’) as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s 
Motion to Quash or, in the Alternative, for a Protective Order at 11, In re US Airways Group, 
Inc., No. 02-83984-SSM, D.I. 4182 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 6, 2003).   
 95.   303 B.R. at 797. 
 96.   Id. at 798. 
 97.   Id. at 797.  The U.S. Airways court stated this twice, the first time citing a notice in 
the Federal Register from 1993.  See id. at 788 (“The stated goal of the regulation is to generate 
a value which will ‘accurately approximate the cost of [single-premium] group annuity 
contracts’ that would pay the benefits promised under the terminated plan.”  (quoting 58 Fed. 
Reg. 5128)).  As discussed in the next section of this Article, however, this statement of the 
Valuation Regulation’s purpose is incorrect, and indeed is contradicted by the very same 
Federal Register publication. 
 98.   Id. at 797.  The court stated: 
That the survey has serious limitations is hardly to be questioned.  Because of the 
anonymous manner in which the survey is conducted, the PBGC has no way of 
knowing whether it is receiving responses from market leaders or small players, 
nor does it have any way of independently verifying that the values reported on 
the survey forms accurately reflect what the responding company is actually 
charging for the annuity policies it sells.  Indeed, because it does not itself send 
out the survey forms, the PBGC does not even know the specific universe of 
companies to which the forms were sent.  As the General Accounting Office has 
recently observed in a report to Congress, the anonymous nature of the survey 
necessarily creates “ambiguity about the extent to which the PBGC interest rate 
factors reflect the current broad market for group annuities.”  These limitations 
are an unavoidable consequence of the unwillingness of commercial insurance 
companies to release sensitive pricing information (or at least, to release it in such 
a form that specific prices can be identified with specific companies).  Short of 
Congress enacting a statute permitting the PBGC to subpoena the information, it 
is difficult to see how the PBGC could overcome the inherent limitations of the 
present survey. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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reasoned that “the issue is not whether the survey could be improved” but 
“whether, notwithstanding its limitations, the survey is nevertheless a 
rational way for the PBGC to implement the stated goal of determining a 
value that approximates the cost of a commercial annuity.”99  Nowhere did 
the U.S. Airways court consider whether the use of annuity pricing was 
consistent with the rationale for the regulation, or otherwise an appropriate 
methodology for calculating UBL damages. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the U.S. Airways decision, in the 
more than ten years since it was issued, several additional bankruptcy courts 
have held that the Valuation Regulation controls in bankruptcy.100  These 
decisions, however, have contained minimal, if any, analysis.101  Most 
importantly, the question whether the Valuation Regulation is arbitrary and 
capricious under the APA or Chevron102 is not addressed in any of these 
 
 99.   Id.  The U.S. Airways court also attempted to bolster its conclusion by noting that 
“the statute defines ‘unfunded benefit liabilities’ as being the amount determined by reference 
to the PBGC valuation regulation” and “[t]hat regulation was already in effect when the statute 
was amended to its present form, and the court must therefore presume that Congress knew 
and approved of the PBGC’s general methodology.”  Id. at 796.  This argument merely begs 
the question, however, of what, if anything, Congress intended to ratify – the ACLI Survey-
based methodology for determining the Annuity Interest factors (which factors are not part of 
the Valuation Regulation except to the extent the rates that use such factors without 
explanation appear in Appendix B to the regulation) or the objective of the Valuation 
Regulation stated repeatedly by the PBGC over many years (which, as addressed in the next 
section of this Article, is to approximate the PBGC’s own costs in providing pension benefits 
to beneficiaries under terminated plans). 
 100.   See, e.g., In re Durango Georgia Paper Co., No. 02-21669, 2017 WL 221785, at *3 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 2017); In re Wolverine, Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, 436 B.R. 253, 
262-63 (D. Mass. 2010); Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes Inc.), 382 B.R. 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2008); United Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n (In re UAL Corp.), 346 B.R. 456 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); Order, In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., No. 05-10787 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. July 27, 2006) [D.I. 2048]); In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 
2005) (Order and Trans. Of Hearing, Dec. 16, 2005, at 32-33).  
 101.   There are cases in which the discount-rate issue was mentioned, but only in the 
context of approving a settlement and therefore without reaching any determination on the 
underlying substantive issue.  See In re Wolverine, Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, 436 B.R. 253, 
262-63 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing discount rate in the settlement context); In re Kaiser 
Aluminum Corp., 339 B.R. 91, 96 (D. Del. 2006) (noting in settlement context that “in the 
face of these complex and uncertain issues, it is difficult to envision who would succeed, but 
not difficult to envision complex, costly and time-consuming litigation”); see also In re Sea 
Containers, Ltd., No. 06-11156 (KJC), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2363, at *23 n. 9 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Sept. 19, 2008). 
 102.   In three of those decisions, the parties explicitly disclaimed any argument that the 
Valuation Regulation was invalid outside of bankruptcy and instead relied exclusively on the 
argument that a different rate should apply in bankruptcy as a matter of law.  See Order and 
Trans. Of Hearing, Dec. 16, 2005 at 33, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 
30, 2005) (nothing that “neither the committee nor ALPA have argued that the regulations are 
inapplicable or would not be used to determine the amount of United’s unfunded benefit 
liabilities under applicable nonbankruptcy law”); In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., No. 05-
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decisions.  None of the subsequent decisions has considered, examined or 
even questioned the U.S. Airways court’s assumption regarding the rationale 
for the Valuation Regulation. 
III. THE PBGC’S ANNUITY-BASED VALUATION REGULATION IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS STATED RATIONALE, AND IS THEREFORE 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
While courts have mentioned briefly the APA and Chevron doctrine in 
discussing the Valuation Regulation, none has given thoughtful 
consideration to the analysis required under those rubrics.  In particular, the 
decision in U.S. Airways – and therefore the decisions following it – proceeds 
from a fundamental misapprehension regarding the Valuation Regulation’s 
history and purpose. 
Central to the U.S. Airways analysis upholding the application of the 
Valuation Regulation in bankruptcy was the court’s determination that “[t]he 
stated goal of the regulation is to determine a value for the unfunded benefit 
liabilities that approximates the cost of purchasing an annuity contract from 
a commercial insurer that would pay the same benefits.”103  Though 
acknowledging the ACLI Survey’s shortcomings, the court reasoned that 
“notwithstanding its limitations, the survey is nevertheless a rational way for 
the PBGC to implement the stated goal of determining a value that 
approximates the cost of a commercial annuity.”104  The cases following U.S. 
Airways have followed suit without questioning that premise. 
As described more fully below, that basic premise is simply wrong: 
contrary to the PBGCs more recent litigation stance, the stated goal of the 
Valuation Regulation – as stated repeatedly in the Federal Register since 
1975 – has never been to mirror annuity pricing for its own sake.  Rather, 
since 1975, the PBGC has consistently stated in its notice-and-comment 
rulemakings that the rationale underlying (and thus purportedly justifying) 
the Valuation Regulation is that the amount of the PBGC’s claim should 
reflect the actual cost to the PBGC of providing the pension benefits for 
 
10787, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 26, 2006) (stating that “the parties agreed to narrow 
the initial issue for determination to whether this court should utilize the underlying 
substantive law, namely the PBGC’s regulations, to determine the amount of its claim or 
whether the Court should utilize a prudent investor approach advocated by the Chapter 11 
Trustee”); Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes, Inc.), 382 B.R. 550, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(stating that “[i]ndeed, the Liquidating Agent has not contended that outside of bankruptcy 
and without obtaining a judgment invalidating PBGC’s regulations, Debtors could 
successfully challenge the amount of PBGC’s claim solely on the ground that the claim is 
excessive due to PBGC’s use of an inappropriate discount rate”).  
 103.  303 B.R. at 797. 
 104.   Id. at 797. 
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which it is assuming responsibility upon a plan’s termination.  While the cost 
to the PBGC of providing benefits could in theory mirror the cost of annuity 
contracts – if the PBGC in fact purchased annuities – the reality is that it does 
not do so.  Even if the PBGC initially anticipated that it would buy annuities 
or engage in investment practices comparable to insurance companies, the 
PBGC has made no attempt to demonstrate why it would be the case that 
annuity contracts would accurately reflect its own costs given its now 
longstanding practice of investing in a diversified portfolio that does not 
include annuities.  Courts, in assessing whether the Valuation Regulation 
applies in bankruptcy, have likewise failed to grapple with whether the 
current Valuation Regulation’s use of annuity pricing bears any rational 
relationship to the stated purpose of the regulation. 
A. Legal Framework: Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review Requires 
Courts to Consider a Regulation’s Purpose and Rationale 
The APA states, in relevant part, that a reviewing court must “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”105  The Chevron doctrine is a standard of statutory 
interpretation that grew out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.106  The doctrine provides that 
a court will defer to an agency’s interpretation of a federal statute that the 
agency is charged with administering if the statute is silent or ambiguous on 
the question at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.107  The 
Court further explained that where Congress “has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill” and has expressly delegated authority to that agency to 
legislate regulations accordingly, “[s]uch legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”108  Thus, in practice, there is likely to be little 
difference between the analysis under Chevron versus the APA, as both call 
 
 105.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 106.   467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 107.   Id. at 842-43.  The Supreme Court has stated that the PBGC is an agency eligible for 
Chevron deference when the PBGC’s interpretation is reasonable.  See Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (noting that “[h]aving determined that the 
PBGC’s construction is not contrary to clear congressional intent, we still must ascertain 
whether the agency’s policy is based upon a ‘permissible’ construction of the statute, that is, 
a construction that is ‘rational and consistent with the statute’”).  There is an active 
jurisprudential debate concerning Chevron itself and whether the effective delegation of 
legislative authority to an agency under any circumstances is appropriate.  This Article does 
not take a position on that debate and tests the Valuation Regulation assuming that Chevron 
remains good law. 
 108.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.   
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for an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review where Congress has 
made an express delegation of rulemaking authority to the agency.109 
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
requires that the agency examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”110  The Supreme Court has 
held that, in reviewing that explanation, the court must “consider whether 
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment.”111  An agency rule will generally 
be found to be “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that 
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”112  Even if the agency can articulate a legitimate reason for a given 
policy choice, its method of effectuating this policy choice must be rational 
– if there is no rational relationship between an agency’s policy objective 
and its approach, then the approach must be struck down as arbitrary and 
capricious.113 
In conducting this analysis, courts are generally limited to examining 
the administrative record.  The APA explicitly instructs a reviewing court to 
look at the whole administrative record when deciding whether to set aside 
agency action,114 and courts have consistently refused to consider an 
agency’s “post hoc rationalizations” and litigation positions.115 
 
 109.   See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 n.7 (2011) (noting that its analysis pursuant 
to the APA’s standard of judicial review would be the same if conducted under Chevron step 
two, “because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary 
or capricious in substance’”). 
 110.   Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 111.   State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  
 112.  Id.; see also Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (holding the EPA’s 
interpretation unreasonable under Chevron, because it did not take cost into account when 
deciding whether it was appropriate to regulate power plants, and quoting State Farm for the 
proposition that “agency action is only lawful when it rests on a consideration of the relevant 
factors”).  
 113.   See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55, 64 (2011) (holding that courts must reverse 
an agency rule “unmoored from the purposes and concerns” of the relevant statute and that an 
agency must effectuate its policy choice in “some rational way” and “based on non-arbitrary, 
relevant factors” (internal citations omitted)).  
 114.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  
 115.   Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also 
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (noting that “we insist 
that an agency examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action”); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (noting that 
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Of some relevance here given that the Valuation Regulation was 
originally promulgated in the 1970s, the Supreme Court has also explained 
that the passage of time alone will not insulate a regulation from review.  
Indeed, as the Court has explained, a “rule’s vintage” is a “slender reed to 
support a significant government policy,” as “[a]rbitrary agency action 
becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition.”116  On the other hand, 
changes in agency policy also require justification.117 
B. Rationale for the Valuation Regulation: The Discount Rate Should 
Reflect the PBGC’s Actual Costs 
The PBGC’s original notice in the Federal Register regarding the 
proposed Valuation Regulation, which appeared on December 12, 1975, 
stated that the rationale for the proposed regulation was that the interest rate 
(and other assumptions) applied to the PBGC’s claim should reflect the 
actual cost to the PBGC of providing the pension benefits: 
General Approach.  The value of a benefit as of the date of 
termination is the current value of the cost that the PBGC normally 
should incur as of the date of termination, in providing the benefit 
under reasonable assumptions as to mortality, rates of retirement 
when early retirement is possible, administrative expenses that will 
be incurred, and investment return assumptions reflecting current 
and longer term investment opportunities.  The PBGC’s 
assumptions will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes 
in market conditions and mortality assumptions.118 
 
“Overton Park suggests that § 706(2)(A) . . . imposes a general ‘procedural’ requirement of 
sorts by mandating that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that 
will enable the court to evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision”); Florida Power 
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (“If the record before the agency does 
not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the 
reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record 
before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 
additional investigation or explanation.”). 
 116.   Judulang, 565 U.S. at 61.  
 117.   See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (holding that 
“a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or 
were engendered by the prior policy” and an “[u]nexplained inconsistency in agency policy 
is a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency 
practice” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 118.   40 Fed. Reg. 57982, 57982 (Dec. 12, 1975) (emphasis added).  The PBGC went on 
to add that “[t]he current value of plan benefits represents an estimate of costs to the PBGC, 
not of costs to the plan sponsor.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In fact, the PBGC anticipated that 
its cost of providing benefits would be lower – not higher – than the cost incurred by plan 
sponsors.  Id. (“In general, because the PBGC can pool the assets and liabilities of many 
terminated plans for purposes of asset management, benefit administration and the purchase 
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The implication of this general approach for interest rates was clear: 
“To value benefits upon termination, interest assumptions should reflect 
current market opportunities.”119  As of 1975, the PBGC apparently 
contemplated that those “market opportunities” in which it would invest 
would include the “purchase of annuities,” as stated in the preamble to the 
original proposed rule.120  Indeed, when first announcing that it was using 
interest rates derived from annuity price data in 1976,121 the PBGC explained 
that the rationale for using annuity-based rates was to estimate the PBGC’s 
actual costs:  “the PBGC believes that the interest rate assumptions 
underlying quotations for the purchase of large blocks of annuities from 
private insurers provide the most reliable basis for estimating PBGC’s 
expected investment experience.”122 
In 1978, the PBGC went even further, specifically staking out the 
position that the Annuity Interest Factors do not “overcharge” employers.  
For example, in the course of responding to a public comment in 1978 that 
the PBGC’s rates were “too low” relative to actual market conditions, i.e., 
relative to “the higher rates of yield for Standard & Poors (‘S&P’) long-term 
government bonds and ‘AAA’ Industrial bonds,” the PBGC rejected the 
suggestion that its regulatory rates in fact did, or were intended to, produce 
a result materially different from the PBGC’s actual cost of providing the 
benefits following plan termination.123  It stated: 
The PBGC does not believe that the rates being established . . . 
result in an “overcharge” to terminating plans.  Section 
4002(a)(1) of ERISA enjoins PBGC to carry out its functions 
under Title IV so as to encourage the continuation of private 
pension plans.  To this end, the PBGC has sought to set rates that 
will not encourage plan terminations and/or PBGC trusteeships.  
On the other hand, the PBGC is also concerned that assessments 
for employer liability not be greater than what PBGC expects it 
will need to meet its guaranty liabilities for insufficient plans.  
Thus, PBGC has adopted what it believes is a balanced approach 
in setting its rates.124 
 
of annuities, the PBGC’s projected costs in providing plan benefits should generally be less 
than the costs that would be incurred by some individual plans themselves, especially very 
small plans, which are expected to constitute a majority of terminating plans.”). 
 119.   Id. (emphasis added).   
 120.   Id. (stating that “the PBGC can pool the assets and liabilities of many terminated 
plans for purposes of asset management, benefit administration and the purchase of 
annuities”). 
 121.   41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976). 
 122.   41 Fed. Reg. 48498, 48498 (Nov. 3, 1976) (emphasis added). 
 123.   43 Fed. Reg. 55240, 55240-41 (Nov. 27, 1978). 
 124.   Id. at 55241.   
BROMLEY_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:12 PM 
272 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.2 
 
Two years later, in the context of proposing a method for publishing its 
interest factors on a prospective rather than retrospective basis, the PBGC 
again reaffirmed its cost-based rationale for setting those rates.  Once again, 
the PBGC made clear that “[t]he current value of a benefit as of a specific 
date is equal to the amount of money needed on that date in order to be able 
to pay the benefit over future years, taking into account reasonable and 
current expectations as to the mortality, administrative expenses and interest 
earnings (i.e., the rate of return to be earned on the investment of the 
money).”125  While acknowledging, consistent with this premise, that 
“[u]nder usual insurance practices, the interest rate assumption would be an 
estimate of the rate of return to be earned during a future interval of time on 
funds set aside to meet future benefit obligations,” the PBGC went on to say 
that it “believes that its relatively brief period of investment experience is 
neither sufficient nor necessarily an appropriate basis from which to project 
future earnings.”126  In other words, the PBGC acknowledged and reaffirmed 
the principle that the interest factors should be tied to the PBGC’s actual 
costs, but stated that – as of 1980 – it lacked sufficient information to 
estimate what those rates would be. 
While the PBGC has been open about its use of annuity pricing, it has 
never announced any change in this underlying cost-based rationale, and has 
repeatedly reaffirmed it over the course of several decades, including 
specifically restating that rationale verbatim in its 1993 rulemaking.127  It has 
also consistently maintained its pledge to update the assumptions underlying 
the Valuation Regulation as needed to mirror market realities.128 
 
 125.   45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980). 
 126.   Id.  The PBGC went on to add that, “[f]urther, the PBGC believes it would not be 
appropriate for it to set rates which produce benefit values (annuity prices) that are 
significantly different from the prices of annuities offered by private insurers.  Accordingly, 
PBGC will continue its practice of setting its interest rate and factors so as to produce benefit 
values that are intended to be comparable to prices offered by private insurers.”  Id.  
 127.   42 Fed. Reg. 2678, 2678 (Jan. 13, 1977) (“The valuation rates prescribed by the 
PBGC are designed to reflect PBGC’s cost of providing benefits in terminating plans.”); 45 
Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980) (“The current value of a benefit as of a specific date 
is equal to the amount of money needed on that date in order to be able to pay the benefit over 
future years, taking into account reasonable and current expectations as to the mortality, 
administrative expenses and interest earnings (i.e., the rate of return to be earned on the 
investment of the money).”); 58 Fed. Reg. 5128, 5128 (Jan. 19, 1993) (quoting the rationale 
stated in the Dec. 12, 1975 proposed rulemaking).  While PBGC has taken a more defensive 
tone in its more recent Federal Register discussions of the Annuity Interest Factors after they 
were successfully challenged in bankruptcy cases – stating in 2005 for example that the 
“derived interest factors are not market interest rates” and “it is never meaningful to compare 
PBGC’s interest factors to market interest rates,” 48 Fed. Reg. 12429, 12430 (Mar. 14, 2005), 
– it has never explicitly recanted its original cost-based rationale for the regulation, much less 
attempted to provide any official justification for doing so. 
 128.   See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 57982, 57982 (Dec. 12, 1975) (“The PBGC’s assumptions 
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C. The Valuation Regulation Overstates the PBGC’s UBL Claim and 
Does Not Reflect the PBGC’s Actual Costs 
As noted above, the PBGC has long embraced an investment strategy 
based on “prudent” risk taking, under the direction of professional money 
managers.  The result of this approach has been annual returns that, on 
average, significantly outpace the rate of return implicit in the PBGC’s 
Annuity Interest Factors.  In other words, since the PBGC uses a 
sophisticated investment strategy to maximize its returns on its assets, the 
Annuity Interest Factors do not reflect the PBGC’s actual cost in providing 
the pension benefits for a terminated plan. 
This can be seen by examining the PBGC’s annual returns as reflected 
in its annual reports.  As shown below in Table 1, the annual rates of return 
reported by the PBGC in the annual reports available on its website for the 
years 1995 through 2016 vary by year (including some negative returns 
during economic downturns) but average 8.23% when considering annual 
returns, or 8.35% when looking at the 5-year average return reported in each 
Annual Report during that period.  Under either measure, the PBGC’s 
average rate of return is over 8%, and well in excess of the discount rates 
generally dictated by the Annuity Interest Factors, such as the 5.25% long-
term discount rate the PBGC argued for in U.S. Airways.  It is also important 
to note that the figures in Table 1 reflect the PBGC’s earnings from both its 
trust fund and its revolving fund assets.  Looking at the trust fund assets 
alone, the returns are generally higher, owing to the lack of statutory 
constraints on investment approach.  Indeed, the court in U.S. Airways found 
that “reported returns on the PBGC’s trust fund assets over the 18-year 
period from 1985 through 2002 are approximately 10% on an annual 
 
will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes in market conditions and mortality 
experience.”); id. at 58008 (“The interest rates and intervals of deferment contained in this 
Appendix will be amended by the PBGC from time to time to reflect changes in market 
conditions.”); 41 Fed. Reg. 48484, 48485 (Nov. 3, 1976) (“The PBGC intends to be 
monitoring the interest assumptions periodically, and will review the mortality assumptions 
when data is available.  The assumptions will be changed when appropriate.”); 43 Fed. Reg. 
55240, 55240 (Nov. 27, 1978) (“The interest rates and factors set forth in the regulation must 
be adjusted periodically to reflect changes in investment markets. . . . Because these rates and 
factors must be reflective of investment experience, it is necessary to update the rates and 
factors periodically.”); 44 Fed. Reg. 3971, 3971 (Jan. 19, 1979) (expressing the same); 45 
Fed. Reg. 82172, 82172 (Dec. 15, 1980) (stating that “the interest rates and factors set forth 
in the regulation are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in financial and annuity 
markets”); 46 Fed. Reg. 26765, 26766 (May 15, 1981) (“The interest rates and factors set 
forth in Appendix B to Part 2610 are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in financial and 
annuity markets.”); 58 Fed. Reg. 5128, 5128 (Jan. 19, 1993) (quoting original 1975 statement 
that “[t]he PBGC’s assumptions will be adjusted from time to time to reflect changes in 
market conditions and mortality experience”). 
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basis.”129 
 
Table 1: Annual and Five-Year Average Returns Reported by the 
PBGC, 1995-2016 
 
Year Annual Return 
(Percentage) 
Five-Year Average Return 
(Percentage) 
1995 24.1 15.5 
1996 8.5 12.3 
1997 21.9 14.4 
1998 14.4 11.9 
1999 3.6 14.2 
2000 13.2 12.1 
2001 -3.3 9.6 
2002 2.1 5.8 
2003 10.3 5.0 
2004 8.0 5.9 
2005 8.9 5.1 
2006 4.2 6.7 
2007 7.2 7.7 
2008 -6.5 4.2 
2009 13.2 5.2 
2010 12.1 5.8 
2011 5.1 6.0 
2012 12.6 7.1 
2013 2.6 9.0 
2014 8.0 8.0 
2015 0.1 5.6 
2016 10.8 6.7 
Average 8.23 8.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 129.   In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).  Note that 
while the analysis in this Article, and in Table 1 in particular, was performed and initially 
made public prior to the release of the PBGC’s 2017 Annual Report, the inclusion of data 
from the 2017 Annual Report would not materially alter the conclusions reached here.  See 
2017 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 12 (reporting annual rate of return of 5.6%, 
or 5.4% over a five-year period). 
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IV. THE PBGC’S POST HOC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE VALUATION 
REGULATION DO NOT SUPPORT IT 
The foregoing demonstrates that the PBGC’s current annuity-based 
Valuation Regulation cannot be squared with – much less justified by – the 
official cost-based rationale for the Valuation Regulation found in the 
Federal Register.  Perhaps recognizing this disconnect between the 
regulation’s rationale and the PBGC’s desire to charge sponsors of 
terminating plans at an annuity rate, the PBGC has, in responding to legal 
challenges to the Valuation Regulation, attempted to recast the rationale for 
the Valuation Regulation. 
This recasting is perhaps best summarized in a 2013 white paper 
published on the PBGC website, titled “Derivation of Interest Factors in 
PBGC’s Liability Valuation Methodology” (the “White Paper”).130  The 
White Paper, which has not been published in the Federal Register or made 
subject to official public commentary, states that its “purpose” “is to describe 
the rationale for the PBGC’s liability valuation methodology and regulation 
particularly as it relates to the determination and application of interest 
factors.”131  While the White Paper does not constitute the official rationale 
for the Valuation Regulation, which – as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
explained132 – is to be found solely in the official administrative record, it is 
worth considering the arguments raised by the PBGC in the White Paper, 
which mirror the position the PBGC has taken, and likely will continue to 
take, in litigation (and which position has been accepted by bankruptcy 
courts since 2003).133 
In contrast to the official explanation found in the Federal Register, 
which was based on the cost to the PBGC, the White Paper asserts that 
“[f]rom the outset, the cornerstone of the PBGC regulatory approach has 
been to value a plan’s benefit liabilities by approximating the fair market 
price of group annuities sold by private sector insurance companies.”134  The 
White Paper states that the “rationale for valuing liabilities based on their 
market value is twofold”: 
 
 130.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17. 
 131.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 1 (emphasis added).  
 132.   See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (explaining that the official 
rationale for a regulation is found in the administrative record).   
 133.   In its Pre-Trial Brief in U.S. Airways, the PBGC stated that it would “prove that its 
claim is the marketplace value of the Pilots Plan’s liabilities, less the value of the Pilots Plan’s 
assets,” on the basis that the “PBGC’s determination of the unfunded benefit liabilities of the 
Pilots Plan is well within the range of what insurance companies would charge.”  Pre-Trial 
Brief of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation at 28, In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 
02-83984 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2003). 
 134.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added).   
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First, this valuation approach minimizes the “moral hazard” 
inherent in the Title IV termination insurance program by ensuring 
that it is not less costly for an employer to terminate a pension plan 
in a distress termination with the PBGC than to terminate the plan 
in a standard termination in the private sector.  Marking liabilities 
in PBGC-trusteed plans to the annuity market matches those 
liabilities to the price that a plan sponsor would have to pay to 
terminate their plan in the open market.  This avoids the moral 
hazard mentioned above as well as the clear impropriety of 
overpricing PBGC’s trusteeship of a sponsor’s pension plan. 
Second, the regulation is premised on the rationale that valuing a 
liability based on the value a willing buyer and seller would 
exchange for that liability – i.e., a market value obtained in a 
competitive marketplace – is reasonable.135 
Each of these arguments is addressed in turn below. 
A. Annuity Pricing Is Not Necessary to Avoid Any “Moral Hazard” 
The so-called “moral hazard” cited by the PBGC appears to be a 
reference to the fact that in a standard termination an employer “can 
complete the standard termination by distributing plan assets in the form of 
annuities purchased from a private insurer.”136  Though not stated explicitly, 
the PBGC’s argument seems to be that, were it to use a higher discount rate 
reflecting its actual investment experience, plan sponsors would elect to 
engage in distress terminations rather than standard terminations.  There are 
at least two flaws in this argument. 
First, as a threshold matter, the PBGC’s focus on the purchase of 
annuities for a standard termination is misplaced, as a standard termination 
may, but need not be, accomplished by the purchase of annuities.  Rather, by 
statute, a standard termination can also be accomplished by means of lump 
sum payments to participants,137 which in general constitutes a cheaper 
alternative to the purchase of annuities since insurance companies that offer 
annuities must account for the risk they take on in selling those products, and 
is in fact the alternative taken by a large percentage of eligible retirees when 
 
 135.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 2-3. 
 136.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 8 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 
4041.28(c)(2)).  Section 1341(b) provides under “Methods of final distribution of assets” in a 
standard termination that “[i]n distributing such assets, the plan administrator shall – (i) 
purchase irrevocable commitments from an insurer to provide all benefit liabilities under the 
plan, or (ii) in accordance with the provisions of the plan and any applicable regulations, 
otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan.  A transfer of assets to the 
corporation in accordance with section 1350 of this title on behalf of a missing participant 
shall satisfy this subparagraph with respect to such participant.” 
 137.   29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3).  
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given the option.138 
Second, and more fundamentally, the purported choice between a 
standard and a distress termination that underlies the supposed “moral 
hazard” simply is not available.  As the PBGC itself acknowledges in the 
White Paper, an employer may voluntarily terminate an “underfunded plan 
only if the employer and each member of the controlled group meet one of 
ERISA’s tests for financial ‘distress.’”139  None of these tests involves or 
references annuities; rather, they turn on the financial health of the plan 
sponsor.140  Thus, there is no clear “moral hazard” inherent in discounting 
UBL claims according to the PBGC’s rate of return on its investments, given 
that employers are not at liberty to select a distress termination merely 
because they believe it will be more advantageous than a standard 
termination or continuation of the plan. 
 Indeed, to the extent the PBGC was expressing a concern related to the 
ability of a plan sponsor to terminate a pension plan absent financial distress, 
this concern is no longer relevant since Congress amended ERISA in 1986 
and 1987 to provide that an employer may only voluntarily terminate a plan 
where it can be shown that either the plan had sufficient assets to cover 
liabilities or where the employer met the standard for financial distress.141  
The amendments implemented in 1986-87 were designed to correct the 
perceived effect the then-existing system had of “encourag[ing] employers 
to terminate plans, evade their obligations to pay benefits and shift unfunded 
pension liabilities to the insurance program.”142  Thus, the goal was “to 
increase the likelihood that participants will receive their full benefits, to 
 
 138.   Testimony of Craig Rosenthal on Behalf of the American Benefits Council for the 
ERISA Advisory Council: Private-Sector De-Risking and Participant Protections at 4 (June 
5, 2013), available at https://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/?id=e6140ac6-f0b9-
af44-18d0-471154b3b649 [https://perma.cc/L49R-RAHV] (stating “[a]nnuities come at a 
cost to the plan sponsor though, as the cost of purchasing an annuity is almost universally 
higher than the cost of offering lump sums” and that “[t]his increased cost is primarily the 
result of margins imposed by the insurer to cover potential adverse risks, profits, taxes and 
other expenses”). According to Rosenthal, onetime lump-sum offers, including offers in 
connection with a plan terminations, experience an election percentage for participants who 
have not yet commenced benefits in the range of 40 to 60%.  Id. at 6. 
 139.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
 140.   Under ERISA, an employer may voluntarily terminate a pension plan due to financial 
distress only if one of four tests is satisfied: (1) the employer is in liquidation proceedings, (2) 
the employer is in reorganization proceedings and termination is needed for the success of the 
reorganization, (3) without termination, an employer will be unable to meet obligations in 
order to continue in business, or (4) costs of the plan have become “unreasonably 
burdensome” due to declining workforce.  29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B).   
 141.   Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 
Stat. 237 (1986); Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (part of 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987).  
 142.   H.R. REP. No. 99-300, at 312 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 756, 963.   
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limit claims against the PBGC insurance system to instances of severe 
hardship and to assure that the program is prudently financed.”143  Prior to 
the amendments, Congress determined that plan sponsors’ “lack of full 
statutory accountability to participants, beneficiaries, and the PBGC 
provides a disincentive for employers to fully fund their pension plans and 
can result in a funding shortfall that threatens both benefit security and the 
fiscal solvency of the PBGC.”144  By enacting these changes, Congress hoped 
to create a situation where “[p]articipants and beneficiaries and the PBGC 
will incur losses from a plan termination only when the contributing sponsor 
and the other members of its controlled group are so financially distressed 
that they cannot pay the full liability that the bill would impose.”145  Thus, 
Congress has already addressed the “moral hazard” issue and there is no 
credible argument that use of annuity pricing relates to, or can be justified 
by, a moral hazard risk. 
B. The Annuity Interest Factors Do Not Reflect a “Market Price” for 
the PBGC’s Insurance Coverage 
The PBGC also argues for the use of its Annuity Interest Factors based 
“on the rationale that valuing a liability based on the value a willing buyer 
and willing seller would exchange for that liability – i.e., a market value 
obtained in a competitive marketplace – is reasonable.”146  This rationale 
sounds appealing superficially because it suggests that the PBGC is 
estimating how the market might value the coverage of the pension 
obligations provided by the PBGC.  But the PBGC’s rationale mixes “apples 
with oranges” in the sense that what the market is pricing with the Annuity 
Interest Factors are annuities offered by life insurance companies (a product 
that the PBGC does not buy, nor can it provide), whereas what is actually 
being provided by the PBGC is a commitment to cover the future pension 
obligations using earnings generated from PBGC assets.  The two are not the 
same.  The PBGC would never find a willing buyer for its coverage at the 
“price” implied by the Annuity Interest Factors because the PBGC follows 
an investment strategy and has a capital position that are very different from 
life insurance companies. 
When an actual annuity contract is sold by a private insurance company, 
the purchaser pays a lump-sum price for the contract in exchange for a 
promise from the insurance company, as seller, to pay a fixed amount of cash 
on a monthly basis to a set of beneficiaries over a given period; for example, 
 
 143.   Id.  
 144.   H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 109 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1. 
 145.   Id. at 125. 
 146.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 3. 
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until the death of each of the beneficiaries.  Life insurance companies are 
well-capitalized financial institutions that invest the proceeds from their 
annuity sales in relatively low-risk, fixed income assets.147  This is the reason 
that the implied discount rates from the insurance companies are so low:  the 
assets used to pay the annuities over time are invested in low-risk assets with 
low rates of return. 
In contrast, according to its own stated investment policy, the PBGC 
does not follow a low-risk/low return investment strategy.  For instance, in 
its 2008 Annual Report, the PBGC stated that one of the objectives of its 
current investment policy was to “prudently maximize investment 
returns.”148  PBGC director Charles Millard acknowledged the risk profile of 
the PBGC’s strategy, stating that “[t]he PBGC has the ability to accept some 
degree of short-term volatility to achieve our goal of enhancing assets to pay 
benefits.”149  The PBGC, as well as other U.S. government agencies, have on 
multiple occasions recognized the risks inherent in the PBGC investment 
program.  For example, the PBGC’s 2009 Annual Report declares that its 
financial health is subject to “market risk associated with interest rates and 
equity returns” because these factors affect the value of PBGC’s assets.150  
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) designated the PBGC 
single employer program as “high-risk” in July 2003 and added the 
multiemployer program in January 2009.151  These programs still remain on 
the GAO’s high-risk list due to “long-term structural challenges relating to 
funding of defined benefit pension plans.”152  Finally, the U.S. Government 
does not stand behind the PBGC’s obligations and funds from general tax 
revenues are not provided to the PBGC to carry out its mandate.153 
The differences between the PBGC and life insurance companies 
become apparent when examining the asset holdings of the institutions.  As 
 
 147.  Robert McMenamin et al. What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In?, Chicago Fed Letter, 
No. 309, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Apr. 2013.  
 148.   2008 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 18.  This objective has been repeated 
in subsequent investment policy statements.  See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC 
INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT, May 2011 (stating that “[p]rudent risk-taking is 
justifiable”); PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 4, Sep. 
2016 (same). 
 149.  PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Announces New Investment Policy, Feb. 18, 
2008, available at https://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr08-19 [https://perma.cc/YV
Q7-SB5Y].  
 150.   2009 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 22. 
 151.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES, AN UPDATE 150, Feb. 
2011. 
 152.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 20-21. 
 153.  PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Announces New Investment Policy, Feb. 18, 
2008, available at https://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr08-19 [https://perma.cc/94K
Z-VSPJ]. 
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stated in its 2016 Investment Policy Statement, the PBGC aims for a 70/30 
ratio of fixed-income to equity assets.154  As of 2016, the PBGC was roughly 
on track to meet this objective, with approximately 67.6% of its assets in 
fixed-income securities, 28.0% in equities, and the remainder in other 
investments such as real estate and private equity.155  By contrast, insurance 
companies, which are constrained by state laws and regulations concerning 
their investments,156 as well as the practical need to meet long-term 
obligations, invest primarily in fixed-income assets such as corporate bonds 
and mortgages.157  As of year-end 2015, for example, 70.1% of life insurer 
general account assets were held in bonds, with corporate bonds alone 
constituting nearly half of all assets, while only 2.2% of assets were in stocks 
and 10.3 in mortgages (the remainder was comprised of real estate, and other 
investments).158  Thus, compared to the life insurers, the PBGC holds a much 
larger proportion of its investments in relatively risky equities and a smaller 
proportion in lower risk fixed-income and other debt securities.  While the 
large weight of the PBGC’s allocation in equities generates higher average 
returns for the PBGC, it comes with a commensurate level of risk not 
embraced by insurances companies. 
The PBGC and insurance companies also differ in their capital 
positions, i.e., the difference between the value of assets and liabilities.  As 
noted in its 2016 Annual Report, for FY 2016 the PBGC’s Single Employer 
Program reported approximately $97.3 million in assets and $117.9 million 
in liabilities, for a deficit of approximately $20.6 billion (i.e., roughly 17% 
 
 154.   PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 5, Sept. 
2016. 
 155.   2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP 68 (reporting $57,292 million in fixed 
maturity securities, $23,684 million in equity securities, and $84,732 million in total assets, 
in each case by market value). 
 156.   NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS., CONSUMER PROTECTION 
COMPARISON: THE FEDERAL PENSION SYSTEM AND THE STATE INSURANCE SYSTEM 17, May 
22, 2016 (noting that “state insurance commissioners heavily regulate and closely monitor 
life insurer investments,” which must generally be made up of “highly rated, investment grade 
debt obligations” and that “life insurers are generally restricted from investing in the aggregate 
more than 20% of their admitted assets in equities listed on a qualified exchange, or more than 
5% in the aggregate in equities of unaffiliated entities not listed on a qualified exchange”). 
 157.  See Robert McMenamin et al. What Do U.S. Life Insurers Invest In?, Chicago Fed 
Letter, No. 309, THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, Apr. 2013  (noting that “fixed-income 
assets like bonds and mortgages constituted the largest share of invested assets, at 75.5% and 
9.6%, respectively,” with corporate bonds alone making up “the largest share of general-
account assets” at 46.0%,” while equities constituted only 2.3%). 
 158.   AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2016 11.  Note that these 
figures exclude assets held in separate accounts for liabilities associated with investment risk 
pass-through products, such as variable annuities or variable life insurance, id. at 7, 11, which 
are not the focus here.   
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of liabilities).159  By comparison, insurance companies are required, subject 
to regulatory oversight, to maintain assets in excess of insurance 
obligations.160  As of 2015, the vast majority of insurance companies had a 
risk-based capital ratio – the excess of assets over the minimum amount 
needed to avoid triggering regulatory action – of 200% or greater, with an 
average ratio of 486%.161  In other words, insurance companies generally 
carry well in excess of twice the required level of assets.  The positive capital 
positions of the life insurers provide them with an extra “equity cushion” 
against any losses on their assets. 
There are other important differences, too.  As noted by the GAO, the 
PBGC differs from insurance companies in that (1) it is unable to set the 
level of premiums that it receives from plan sponsors to insure their plans, 
and (2) it must take on new participants, irrespective of the financial health 
of the terminated plans.162 
Given the PBGC’s stated investment goals of prudent risk-taking, as 
well as its portfolio holdings and capital position, which together imply an 
explicitly higher risk and return strategy, the PBGC cannot duplicate the low 
risk and return profile implied by annuity contracts offered by life insurance 
companies.  The only “market” rate that the PBGC could use to discount 
pension obligations would have to be higher than the Annuity Interest 
Factors in order to reflect the realities of the PBGC’s investment strategy and 
capital position.  Therefore, when the PBGC uses its Annuity Interest Factors 
to discount pension obligations, it understates the discount rate, which leads 
the present value of the obligations to be overstated. 
Moreover, even when the PBGC is permitted to collect an oversized 
claim based on its Annuity Interest Factors, it is still unable to offer a risk-
 
 159.   See 2016 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANN. REP. 28.  As noted, supra note 9, the 
PBGC again reported substantial deficits in 2017.  See 2017 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. 
ANN. REP. 10 (reporting.$10.9 billion deficit for the single-employer program and $65.1 
billion deficit for the multiemployer program).  Although there is arguably some circularity 
in assessing the PBGC’s deficit on the basis of its Annual Reports, which similarly use 
artificially low discount rates, there is little disputing that the PBGC is poorly capitalized 
relative to most insurance companies. 
 160.   See generally NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS., CONSUMER 
PROTECTION COMPARISON: THE FEDERAL PENSION SYSTEM AND THE STATE INSURANCE 
SYSTEM 16-17, May 22, 2016. 
 161.   AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2016 25, 30.  To provide 
another metric, in 2015, the aggregate capital ratio of U.S. life insurers (defined as surplus 
funds plus capital stock plus asset valuation reserve as a percentage of general account assets) 
was 10.7%.  Id. at 24. 
 162.  GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.  The GAO also noted that although the 
PBGC has adjusted its investment policy several times over the years, these “frequent changes 
in policy have had a moderate impact on PBGC’s actual allocation of assets since 1976 
because there were no allocation targets in place prior to 1990 and the policy targets after that 
time were rarely ever met.”   
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free benefit given its asset allocation practices and capital position.  Any 
amount the PBGC recovers through its UBL claim, together with the 
earnings from the plan assets that the PBGC inherits, is invested according 
to the PBGC’s investment policy and alongside the PBGC’s other assets as 
part of the total mix of assets available to the PBGC to meet obligations for 
all trusteed plans.  As a result, a higher claim amount does not guarantee (or 
nearly guarantee) that all the pension obligations will be paid when they 
come due; the overstated amounts are still subject to the same risks inherent 
in PBGC’s aggregate investment portfolio.163 
To be sure, if the PBGC starts with an overstated amount with which to 
invest, the expected dollar return on those amounts will more than cover the 
pension obligations for a given pension plan in isolation.  Indeed, the PBGC 
would expect to earn a surplus above what is owed on the pension 
obligations.  This surplus would benefit the PBGC by potentially 
strengthening its financial position, albeit at the cost of reducing the claim 
amounts available to other creditors.  But even providing the PBGC with an 
overstated claim would not be sufficient to guarantee the pension obligations 
it has taken on for any given plan.  In order for the PBGC to provide 
terminated pension plans with the same level of certainty of future benefit 
payments that private insurance companies can provide, it would need to 
fundamentally alter how it operates.  In theory, the PBGC could buy 
annuities from private insurance companies for plan participants.164  The 
PBGC could also change its investment allocation practices to be consistent 
with private sector insurance companies.  To date, neither of these steps has 
been taken, however, nor has the PBGC indicated any intention to make such 
changes, to the extent it could do so.  Therefore, the PBGC cannot provide 
trusteed plans with the certainty offered by private insurance companies and 
implied in the Annuity Interest Factors.  The PBGC may wish to charge plan 
sponsors for offering that level of certainty, but it simply cannot offer it.  It 
currently charges for something that it does not provide, and cannot provide. 
In light of the forgoing, it becomes clear that the more appropriate rate 
for discounting UBL claims is the expected return on the PBGC portfolio.  
Only by discounting the pension obligations at the expected return on the 
PBGC portfolio can one appropriately match “apples to apples” – using the 
PBGC’s expected investment return as a discount rate that reflects the ability 
of the PBGC to generate a return based on its own investment risk and return 
 
 163.   Given its capital position, the only way for the PBGC to provide a (nearly) risk-free 
benefit is to invest in (nearly) risk-free assets. 
 164.   In theory, Congress could set premiums charged to non-terminated pension plans 
such that the revenue would pay for the difference between the cost of the annuities purchased 
and the amount of assets recovered from terminated pension plans and their plan sponsors.  
Congress has not done so. 
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profile to meet the payments under the pension obligations. 
While it may have made some sense initially for the PBGC to use 
Annuity Interest Factors to estimate the cost that the PBGC would incur in 
providing benefits – indeed, the PBGC may have envisioned that it would in 
fact purchase annuities – that is no longer the case.  As discussed above, it 
appears that the PBGC initially used annuity contracts to estimate PBGC 
investment returns because, through September 1976, the PBGC maintained 
an asset mix that was similar to insurance companies.165  However, beginning 
in late 1976 and thereafter, the PBGC deviated from the low-risk and low-
return profile of life insurance companies by increasing its investment in 
equities.166  But the PBGC failed to divorce itself from the use of annuity 
prices to calculate its discount rates.  By 1980, the PBGC defended its 
continued use of life annuities to infer discount rates in place of its actual 
investment returns by suggesting that it did not yet have sufficient 
investment return information to switch to a different discount rate.167  The 
PBGC also began to argue that discounting at rates higher than those implied 
by life annuity contracts – even if the higher rates more accurately reflected 
the PBGC’s investment profile – could provide incentives for on-going plans 
to terminate,168 a purported concern that is no longer relevant in light of 
subsequent amendments to ERISA providing that plan sponsors may not 
voluntarily terminate defined-benefit pension plans absent financial 
distress.169  The PBGC no doubt came to appreciate over time the fact that 
its continued use of Annuity Interest Factors is hugely beneficial to its 
bottom line, effectively allowing it to pursue claims that yield recoveries far 
in excess of recoveries that would be generated by claims premised on a cost-
based damages approach.  Thus, while the PBGC rulemaking originally 
 
 165.   In November 1976, the PBGC wrote that it “believes that the interest rate 
assumptions underlying quotations for the purchase of large blocks of annuities from private 
insurers provide the most reliable basis for estimating PBGC’s expected investment 
experience.”  41 Fed. Reg. 48498 (Nov. 3, 1976).  Meanwhile, “[t]he PBGC Total Fund 
allocation in September 1976 (the beginning of the historical sample period) was similar to 
that found among life insurance companies,” GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 54. 
 166.   The “period (September 1976 to August 1987) was characterized by a trend of 
allocation away from bonds into equities such that the allocation altered from 15 percent 
equities, 84 percent bonds in September 1976 to 64 percent equities, 31 percent bonds by 
August 1987.”  GAO-11-271 REPORT, supra note 27, at 53. 
 167.   “Under usual insurance practices, the interest rate assumption would be an estimate 
of the rate of return to be earned during a future interval of time on funds set aside to meet 
future benefit obligations. The PBGC believes that its relatively brief period of investment 
experience is neither sufficient nor necessarily an appropriate basis from which to project 
future earnings.”  45 Fed. Reg. 38415, 38416 (June 9, 1980). 
 168.   “To this end, the PBGC has sought to set rates that will not encourage plan 
terminations and/or PBGC trusteeships.”  43 Fed. Reg. 55240, 55241 (Nov. 27, 1978). 
 169.   See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.  
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intended that future benefit obligations be discounted at rates that reflected 
the PBGC’s investment performance, the PBGC froze in place its use of 
annuity contracts to infer discount rates, thus defaulting on its commitment 
to update the assumptions as necessary to reflect the PBGC’s actual costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of the law with respect to the Valuation Regulation is 
untenable.  The Valuation Regulation is in conflict with its own rationale, 
and is also in significant tension with the bedrock principles of bankruptcy 
law that form the context in which the PBGC’s UBL claims are litigated.  As 
argued herein, the conflict between the PBGC’s Valuation Regulation and 
its own rationale should lead courts to the conclusion that the regulation is 
arbitrary and capricious, and not entitled to any deference in determining the 
appropriate discount rate for the PBGC’s UBL claims – in bankruptcy or 
otherwise. 
There are two basic roads to reform.  First, the PBGC can revise its 
methodology for devising the discount rates used in the Valuation 
Regulation.  This would not require a major overhaul of the regulation itself, 
which only uses the Annuity Interest Factors as one of several components 
in determining the UBL claim amount.  Indeed, the PBGC has repeatedly 
stated that the assumptions underlying the computation of its UBL claim 
amount will be updated in the future as necessary to more accurately reflect 
market conditions.  As demonstrated herein, the time for the PBGC to make 
such an amendment to its interest factors is long overdue. 
Second, if the PBGC is not prepared to revise the Valuation Regulation, 
Congress should act.  If it were truly Congress’s intention that the PBGC be 
granted an outsized claim in bankruptcy to the detriment of other unsecured 
creditors, so be it.  But Congress has never so indicated, notwithstanding the 
PBGC’s insistence that Congress has “ratified” the current Valuation 
Regulation.  If, on the other hand, Congress did not intend for the PBGC to 
exercise advantages over other similarly situated creditors in bankruptcy – 
besides those it expressly granted to the PBGC in providing that it could 
recover from any member of a plan sponsor’s controlled group – then a 
clarifying amendment to ERISA mandating a cost-based approach to 
discounting the PBGC’s UBL claim would have a salutary effect, bringing 
both greater clarity and fairness to bankruptcy proceedings to which the 
PBGC is a party. 
Finally, if neither road to reform is pursued, courts have ample basis 
today to reject UBL claims based on the PBGC’s annuity-pricing-derived 
discount rates.  Congress provided the PBGC with enormous benefits 
through joint-and-several controlled group liability.  It did not provide the 
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PBGC with authorization to use an arbitrary and capricious discount rate to 
outsize its UBL claims. 
 
